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Introduction
IN A RECENT OPINION dissenting from the Court’s holding that a
certain drug used in Oklahoma and other states to carry out lethal
injections was constitutional, Justice Breyer called for full briefing on
the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty itself.1 The de-
cades-long litigation over the constitutionality of execution methods
obscured many of the important issues associated with the death pen-
alty. Now that the Supreme Court has brought an end to this litiga-
tion, this is an appropriate time to have an honest conversation about
whether the United States should continue to employ the death pen-
alty. The time is now ripe to have this conversation because of the
declining public support for the death penalty and the difficulty the
courts have had in administering it. The purpose of this article is to
contribute to the conversation about the constitutionality of the death
penalty.
This article will begin with a discussion of the declining public
support for the death penalty and some of the reasons behind the
decline in Part I. Part II pertains to how the legislature and the Su-
preme Court have attempted to rectify the problems that have
plagued the death penalty and why these attempts have largely failed.
Given the difficulties the Supreme Court has encountered in trying to
fix the death penalty, Part II also assesses the available options moving
forward: either continue the attempt to reform and regulate the death
penalty or abolish it. The article concludes that abolition is the best
option moving forward. Part II, lastly, lays out the doctrinal framework
that the Supreme Court has created that would enable the Court to
abolish the death penalty. Finally, Part III lists some of the anticipated
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1. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2716, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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objections to the Court abolishing the death penalty, the Court’s pre-
vious failed attempt to do so, and why abolition is likely to achieve
greater public acceptance this time.
I. Declining Public Support
Public support for the death penalty has drastically declined dur-
ing the last twenty years. According to a Gallup survey, in 1994, 80% of
Americans supported the death penalty.2 In 2014, support for the
death penalty was at 60%.3 There are other strong indicia of the pub-
lic’s declining support for the ultimate punishment. First, the number
of individuals sentenced to death by juries and judges has also de-
clined significantly during the past twenty years. In 1994, 311 death
sentences were meted out by juries and judges.4 In 2014, only seventy-
three death sentences were imposed.5 In 2015, forty-nine individuals
received death sentences, a 33% decline from the previous year and
the fewest since 1973.6 Even in Texas, the leader among the states in
carrying out the death penalty since 1976, far fewer death sentences
are being imposed.7 Juries sentenced forty-eight individuals to death
in 1999, but only eleven individuals in 2014 and an astoundingly low
total of two individuals in 2015.8
Second, there has been a steady, nationwide decline in execu-
tions in the last twenty years. Executions have fallen from a high of
ninety-eight executions in 1999, to thirty-five in 2014, and twenty-eight
2. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans’ Support for Death Penalty Stable, GALLUP (Oct. 23,
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/178790/americans-support-death-penalty-stable.aspx?
utm_source=death%20penalty&utm_medium=search&utm_campaign=tiles [https://per
ma.cc/QH9T-KFZ8]; see also, Baxter Oliphant, Support for death penalty lowest in more than
four decades, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sep. 29, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2016/09/29/support-for-death-penalty-lowest-in-more-than-four-decades/ [https://perma
.cc/2L7Q-V7A5] (reporting poll results finding that 49% of public supported the death
penalty while 42% were opposed).
3. See Jones, supra note 2.
4. Death Sentences in the United States From 1977 By State and By Year, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008,
(last visited Dec. 15, 2016) [https://perma.cc/CC5W-VNE3] [hereinafter By Year, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR.].
5. Id.
6. Timothy Williams, Executions by States Fell in 2015, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 16,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/us/executions-by-states-fell-in-2015-report-
says.htmlhpw&rref=us&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=well-region&region=bot
tom-well&WT.nav=bottom-well&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/M5XS-MRBC].
7. By Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 4.
8. Id.
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in 2015, the lowest number of executions since 1991.9 Third, during
the last twenty years, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New
Mexico, and New York have abolished the death penalty and the Gov-
ernors of four other states have imposed moratoriums.10 Finally, fewer
Americans believe the death penalty to be morally acceptable. Gallup
began to measure public sentiment regarding the morality of the
death penalty in 2001. The number of Americans who believe the
death penalty to be morally acceptable during this time period has
gone from a high of 71% in 2006 down to 60% in 2014.11 Most sur-
prisingly, this decline in public support for the death penalty has oc-
curred despite the public’s rising anxiety over terrorism.12
As discussed below, there are many reasons for the decline in the
public’s confidence in the death penalty.
A. Innocence
No issue has had a bigger impact on the public’s attitude towards
the death penalty than the possibility of an innocent person being
executed. Since 1973, there have been approximately 156 actual exon-
erations of death row inmates.13 There are currently approximately
3,000 individuals on death rows throughout the United States.14 Re-
searchers estimate that about 4% of those sentenced to death are actu-
9. Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenalty-
info.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) [https://perma.cc/NLY3-
C7DW] [hereinafter Facts, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.].
10. States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) [https:/
/perma.cc/5ZQ2-9DPT] [hereinafter States, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.]. However, Califor-
nia voters did vote to retain its death penalty in the November 2016 elections. See Mike
McPhate, California Today: Why Californians Kept the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/us/california-today-death-penalty-vote.html
?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/U9TZ-98XY].
11. See Art Swift, Most Americans Continue to Say Death Penalty Morally Ok, GALLUP (June
4, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/183503/americans-continue-say-death-penalty-mor-
ally.aspx?utm_source=&utm_medium=&utm_campaign=tiles [https://perma.cc/59Q7-FU
QF].
12. See, e.g., Rebecca Riffkin, Americans Name Terrorism as No. 1 U.S. Problem, GALLUP
(Dec. 14, 2015) http://www.gallup.com/poll/187655/americans-name-terrorism-no-prob-
lem.aspx [https://perma.cc/B6QY-CWZW].
13. Innocence: List of Those Freed From Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO CTR., http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last visited Oct. 27, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/Y7JS-UH4C].
14. Deborah Fins, Death Row U.S.A., NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, INC. (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/DRUSASpring2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UC5Q-NZ59].
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ally innocent,15 which would mean that there are currently about 120
individuals on death row who may be executed for crimes that they
did not commit. Unfortunately, not every death row inmate with
strong innocence claims has been exonerated. There have been credi-
ble reports indicating that there is a strong possibility that innocent
individuals have been executed.16 One such individual is Cameron
Todd Willingham, who was convicted and sentenced to death as a re-
sult of a fire that killed his three young daughters.17 The state’s case
against Willingham consisted primarily of an expert’s conclusion that
the fire was deliberately set and that because he was the only adult in
the home at the time of the fire, Willingham deliberately started the
fire.18 Shortly before Willingham’s scheduled execution, a report by
an acclaimed scientist and fire investigator indicated that the fire that
killed Willingham’s three daughters was not deliberately set, but was
accidental.19 This information failed to convince either the Texas gov-
ernor or the Board of Pardons and Parole to grant clemency—or even
delay Willingham’s execution—and he was put to death.20 Since Wil-
lingham’s execution, additional fire investigators have reviewed the
case and have determined that the methods used by the state’s trial
expert were flawed and that the fire was not the result of arson.21
Nothing can be done to rectify what appears to have been the wrong-
ful execution of Willingham and others. Cases like Willingham’s, com-
bined with the irrevocability of the death penalty and the other
problems that plague the death penalty that are discussed later in this
15. Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 2726, 2758 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16. See e.g., James S. Liebman, You Can’t Fix the Death Penalty: Carlos DeLuna’s Execution
Shows That a Faster, Cheaper Death Penalty is a Dangerous Idea, L.A. Times (June 1, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/01/opinion/la-oe-liebman-death-penalty-deluna-
20120601 [https://perma.cc/6CGF-4XLG] (after a thorough investigation, the authors
concluded that Carlos DeLuna was sentenced to death and executed for a crime that he
did not commit); Press Release, Gov. Ritter Grants Posthumous Pardon in Case Dating Back to
1930s, Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/ArridyPardon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5GXS-5C9M] (discussing the Colorado Governor’s decision to grant a
posthumous pardon because, according to the Governor, “an overwhelming body of evi-
dence indicates the 23-year-old was innocent, including false and coerced confessions, the
likelihood that Arridy was not in Pueblo at the time of the killing, and an admission of guilt
by someone else.”).
17. See David Gran, Trial by Fire, Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, THE NEW YORKER
(Sep. 7, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine /2009/09/07/trial-by-fire [https://
perma.cc/S2EB-4E64].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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article, have played a large role in shaking public confidence in the
system.
In Herrera v. Collins,22 a majority of the justices of the Unites
States Supreme Court agreed that “the execution of a legally and fac-
tually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable
event.”23 The Court, however, has done little to ensure that this is
prevented. It has failed to recognize the right of death row inmates to
make a stand-alone, actual innocence claim.24 The Court has also held
that inmates have no constitutional right to post-conviction DNA test-
ing.25 The Court has also refused to police the states’ clemency
process.26
B. Race
Another reason for the declining support is the concern over the
continued racial disparities in the administration of the death penalty.
Racism in the implementation of the death penalty does not appear to
be a relic of the past.27 African-Americans continue to be sentenced to
death and executed disproportionately. African-Americans constitute
roughly 13% of the U.S. population,28 yet they account for about 42%
of the death row population29 and approximately 35% of all execu-
tions in the U.S. since 1976.30 It is also troubling that the vast majority
22. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
23. Id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
24. See id. at 416 (justifying the refusal to recognize an actual innocence claim because
“the trial is the paramount event for determining the guilt or innocence of the defen-
dant.”); see also In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 955 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This court has
never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has
had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually’
innocent.” (emphasis in original)).
25. See District Attorney’s Office for the Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52
(2009) (holding that state inmate had no right under the due process clause to postconvic-
tion access to DNA evidence).
26. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1997).
27. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The American Death Penalty and the
(In)visibility of Race, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 245–253 (2015) (reviewing the history of the
racially disproportionate use of the death penalty in the United States).
28. QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST04
5215/00 (last visited Nov. 10, 2016) (go to “TABLE,” “PEOPLE,” and “Race and Hispanic
Origin” subheading) [https://perma.cc/B7SB-8CNM].
29. Facts, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 9 (table labeled “Death Row Inmates
by Race”).
30. Race of Death Row Inmates Executed Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., (Dec. 9,
2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-death-row-inmates-executed-1976 [https://
perma.cc/VB2Y-S3ML] [hereinafter Race, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.].
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of those who have been executed killed white victims,31 despite the
fact that approximately 44% of murder victims in the United States
are African-American.32 Since 1976, 76% of people who have been
executed killed white victims.33 Thus, because African-Americans are
almost one half of all homicide victims, this means that their killers
are, for the most part, not being sentenced to death and executed.
Numerous studies have concluded that these disparities are the result
of racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty.34
The most prominent study to reach such a conclusion was the Baldus
study, which purports to show a disparity in the imposition of the
death penalty in Georgia based on the race of the murder victim and,
to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant.35 The Baldus study took
into account 230 variables “that could have explained the [racial] dis-
parities” in capital sentencing “on non-racial grounds.”36 Even after
taking account of these variables, the Baldus study found that defend-
ants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times more likely to
receive a death sentence than defendants charged with killing blacks
and others.37 The study also found that black defendants were 1.1
times as likely to receive a death sentence as other defendants.38 The
study concluded that black defendants who kill white victims have a
greater likelihood of receiving the death penalty than any other de-
fendant-victim combination.39
31. See id.
32. See Uniform Crime Report; Expanded Homicide Data Table 6: Murder Race, Ethnicity, and
Sex of Victim by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex of Offender, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (2013),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/offenses-known-to-law-
enforcement/expanded-homicide/expanded_homicide_data_table_6_murder_race_and_
sex _of_vicitm_by_race_and_sex_of_offender_2013.xls [https://perma.cc/323C-8EZ9] (in
2013 there were a total of 5,723 murder victims and 2,491, or approximately 44% were
African-American).
33. Race, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 30.
34. See, e.g., D. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, With Recent Findings From Philadelphia, 83 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1638, 1738 (1998) (based on its study of Philadelphia’s administration of its
death penalty, finding “that the problem of arbitrariness and discrimination in the admin-
istration of the death penalty is a matter of continuing concern and is not confined to
southern jurisdictions.”); S. Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45
HOUS. L. REV. 807, 833–834 (2008) (finding that the Harris County District Attorney was
considerably more likely to pursue death against black defendants even when their crimes
are less serious).
35. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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The Supreme Court had largely ignored the issue of racial dispar-
ities in capital sentencing, but the strength of the Baldus findings
forced it to finally confront the issue in 1987. In McCleskey v. Kemp,
although the Court accepted the legitimacy of the Baldus study,40 it
did not allow the inmate to use the statistics as proof of racial discrimi-
nation.41 Rather, the Court held that in order to prevail on a claim of
racial discrimination in capital sentencing, a death row inmate would
have to prove that the decisionmakers in his specific case acted with
discriminatory purpose or that a capital sentencing statute was en-
acted by the legislature with a discriminatory purpose.42 Not surpris-
ingly, given this onerous standard, no death row inmate has been able
to prove racial discrimination in capital sentencing.43
A major reason racial disparities in capital sentencing persist is
because those who decide whether the defendant lives or dies are
overwhelmingly white:
[T]he criminal justice system is the part of American society that
has been least affected by the Civil Rights Movement. Many court-
houses throughout the country look about the same today as they
did in the 1940s and 1950s. The judges are white, the prosecutors
are white, and the court-appointed lawyers are white. Even in com-
munities with fairly substantial African American populations, all
of the jurors at a trial may be white.44
According to a recent study, 95% of elected state and local prose-
cutors are white.45 These overwhelmingly white prosecutors make the
decision whether to seek death in a particular case. They also have a
big influence over who sits on the jury in a capital case. Prosecutors
are obviously aware of the fact that many African-Americans perceive
the criminal justice system to be biased. As a result, a jury composed of
African-Americans is significantly less likely to return a death verdict.46
Therefore, prosecutors have an incentive to remove as many African-
40. Id. at 291 n.7.
41. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291–92.
42. Id. at 297–98.
43. KENNETH WILLIAMS, MOST DESERVING OF DEATH? AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME
COURT’S DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE 45 (2012) (finding that no death row inmate alleg-
ing racial discrimination has prevailed on a McCleskey claim).
44. Stephen B. Bright, The Failure to Achieve Fairness: Race and Poverty Continue to Influ-
ence Who Dies, 11 U. PA. J. CONST L. 23, 27 (2008).
45. See Nicholas Fandos, A Study Documents the Paucity of Black Elected Prosecutors:
Zero in Most States, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/07/us/
a-study-documents-the-paucity-of-black-elected-prosecutors-zero-in-most-states.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/L9GD-3FUA].
46. See William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in
Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Juror’s Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 195 (2001).
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Americans from a capital jury as they possibly can, and they often do
so through the use of peremptory challenges.47 Several studies have
documented the continuing use of peremptory challenges to strike
African-Americans from the jury in capital cases.48
In Batson v. Kentucky,49 the Supreme Court outlawed the use of
race in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Despite Batson, courts
have tended to uphold the prosecutors’ use of peremptory challenges
against African-American members of the jury pool because “[r]ace-
based peremptory strikes are almost always invisible, or at least, as Bat-
son has shown, hard to prove.”50 As long as the prosecutor can articu-
late a race neutral reason for the strike, the courts will usually reject
the defense’s Batson challenge.51 This is so even when the prosecutor
offers an absurd reason for striking black jurors, such as the fact that a
juror agrees with the verdict in the O.J. Simpson case,52 or that the
potential juror has facial hair.53 Despite the continued use of peremp-
tory challenges to remove black jurors from capital cases, the Su-
preme Court has refused to strengthen Batson.
C. Arbitrariness
In 1972, the Court struck down the death penalty—despite no
prior attempts to regulate it54—primarily because of the arbitrary
manner in which the death penalty was imposed at the time.55 The
Court began to regulate the death penalty in 1976 with its decision in
Gregg v. Georgia.56 Its foremost goal in doing so was to minimize the
arbitrary application of the death penalty. The Justices were troubled
by the fact that, in their view, the death penalty “smacks of little more
than a lottery system.”57 However, in Gregg, a substantial majority of
47. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 268–271 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (cit-
ing evidence and studies that despite Batson, the use of peremptory challenges based on
race remains a problem).
48. See Bright supra note 44 at 27 n.15 (discussing the racially-motivated practices of
the Philadelphia and Houston District Attorneys).
49. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
50. See Gilad Edelman, Why Is It So Easy For Prosecutors To Strike Black Jurors?, THE
NEW YORKER (June 5, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-is-it-so-easy-
for-prosecutors-to-strike-black-jurors (italics added) [https://perma.cc/5LBT-PBUK].
51. Id.
52. See Shelling v. State, 52 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. App. 2001).
53. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).
54. See WILLIAMS, supra note 43, at 7–10 (2012).
55. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
56. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141,
1145–47 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 293.
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the Court believed that the death penalty could be imposed less arbi-
trarily.58 In particular, the Court approved of three safeguards that it
believed would minimize arbitrariness: (1) require the jury to con-
sider the circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s background
at a separate sentencing hearing;59 (2) limit the sentencer’s discretion
by providing guidance as to which aggravating circumstances could
warrant the death penalty;60 and (3) an automatic appeals process as a
check on arbitrary decision making.61 The decision in Gregg began the
modern era of capital punishment in the United States. During this
modern era, the Court would closely regulate the death penalty by
restricting its use to certain categories of defendants62 and certain
crimes and by mandating that the defendant be allowed to present
mitigating evidence.63
Despite this effort, the Court’s attempt to restrict the death pen-
alty to those most deserving of death has failed. The death penalty
today is as arbitrary as it was when the Court decided Furman. Several
Justices who have had to administer the death penalty over the years
have acknowledged that the Court’s attempt to regulate the death
penalty has been a failure.64
58. Id. at 188—89.
59. Id. at 191–92.
60. Id. at 192–94.
61. Id. at 195.
62. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–75 (2005) (holding that the death pen-
alty could not be imposed on juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319
(2002) (holding that the death penalty could not be imposed on those defendants who are
intellectually disabled); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (holding that the
death penalty could not be imposed on those inmates who became insane while incarcer-
ated); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (holding that death could not be the
punishment for the crime of rape); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008)
(prohibiting the death penalty for child rapists who do not kill).
63. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978).
64. In Callins v. Collins, Justice Blackmun announced:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death . . . I
feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty
experiment has failed . . . The basic question—does the system accurately and
consistently determine which defendants ‘deserve’ to die?—cannot be answered
in the affirmative.
510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Baze v. Rees, Justice Stevens
wrote that “[f]ull recognition of the diminishing force of the principal rationales for re-
taining the death penalty should lead this Court and legislatures to reexamine the question
recently posed by Professor Salinas, a former Texas prosecutor and judge: ‘Is it time to Kill
the Death Penalty?’” 553 U.S. 35, 81 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Lewis Powell
told his biographer that “I have come to think that capital punishment should be abol-
ished.” JOHN C. JEFFRIES JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451–52 (1994).
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Why does the death penalty continue to be imposed arbitrarily
despite almost forty years of regulation by the Supreme Court? There
are several reasons. First, as pointed out earlier,65 the racial disparities
in every jurisdiction that administers the death penalty66 strongly sug-
gest that it is being imposed in a racially discriminatory manner. Sec-
ond, only a small fraction of murderers are actually sentenced to
death.67 The murders they commit are often less egregious than many
defendants who did not receive death sentences.68 Third, gender
plays a role in that women are rarely sentenced to death.69 Fourth,
geography plays a huge role: Where a defendant killed his victim is
extremely important.70 A killer in Indiana is much less likely to be
sentenced to death than a similar killer in Texas.71 Even within an
active death penalty state, the imposition of the death penalty is heav-
ily dependent on where the killing occurred within a state.72 For in-
stance, a killer in Houston is much more likely to be sentenced to
65. Supra Part I.B.
66. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 27.
67. According to the FBI, in 2013 there were 5,723 murder victims. See Uniform Crime
Report, supra note 32. Yet in 2013 only 83 individuals were sentenced to death. See By Year,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 4.
68. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing a study conducted in Connecticut that found only one of every nine defendants sen-
tenced to death were the “worst of the worst”).
69. Women constitute less than 2% of the death row population. Facts, DEATH PEN-
ALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 9. In light of this reality, defendants in this article are often
referred to in the abstract as male.
70. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2761 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71. See Number of Executions by State and Region, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Dec. 9,
2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976
[https://perma.cc/UJ9R-98FV] [hereinafter Number, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.] (Texas
has executed a total of 538 defendants, whereas Indiana has executed 20); Stephen B.
Bright, The Role of Race, Poverty, Intellectual Disability, and Mental Illness in the Decline of the
Death Penalty, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 671, 673 (2015) (pointing out that 20% of U.S. counties
are responsible for the entire death row population).
72. See Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and its Ramifications, 92 B.U.
L. REV. 227, 231–32 (2012); John J. Donohue III, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut
Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are there Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?,
11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 637, 673 (2014) (“[T]he single most important influence
from 1973-2007 explaining whether a death-eligible defendant [in Connecticut] would be
sentenced to death was whether the crime occurred in Waterbury [County].”); Campbell
Robertson, The Prosecutor Who Says Louisiana Should ‘Kill More People’, N.Y. TIMES (July 7,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/us/louisiana-prosecutor-becomes-blunt-
spokesman-for-death-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/9K7N-R775] (“Within Louisiana,
where capital punishment has declined steeply, Caddo [Parish county] has become an
outlier, accounting for fewer than 5% of the state’s death sentences in the early 1980s but
nearly half over the past five years.”).
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death than a similar killer in Austin.73 Finally, the availability of re-
sources are a crucial factor in whether the death penalty is imposed,74
as some jurisdictions provide more resources for indigent defense
than others.75 This is important because defendants who are repre-
sented by competent trial counsel are significantly less likely to receive
a death sentence.76
In determining who is sentenced to death, the egregiousness of
the crime is a much less important factor than the race of the victim
and defendant, the gender of the defendant, where the crime oc-
curred, and the quality of defense counsel.
D. Incompetent Lawyers
The public has learned that it is usually not the heinousness of
the crime that causes a defendant to end up on death row. Rather, it is
often the quality of the legal representation received that is disposi-
tive.77 Defendants have ended up on death row because their lawyers
slept during the trial,78 were drunk and disoriented at trial,79 failed to
present important evidence,80 failed to understand the law,81 and be-
cause their lawyers simply failed to vigorously defend their clients.82 It
is difficult for the public to have any confidence in a system that deter-
mines who should live or die when one of the key players in that sys-
tem, the defense counsel, is incompetent.
There are several terrible consequences for capital defendants
who receive substandard legal representation. The most serious conse-
73. See Donohue, supra note 72 at 680–81 (pointing out that Harris County [Houston]
is responsible for more executions than all states other than Texas itself).
74. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing to scholars that
suggest that such disparities in resources could also account for the aforementioned geo-
graphical discrepancies).
75. See Gideon’s Broken Promise: America’s Quest for Equal Justice, AM. BAR ASSN. STANDING
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 7–9 (Dec. 2004), http://www.ameri
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_
def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma
.cc/CX62-J2VR].
76. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime
but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835, 1837–41 (1994).
77. Id. at 1836 (“Poor people accused of capital crimes are often defended by lawyers
who lack the skills, resources, and commitment to handle such serious matters.”).
78. See, e.g., Burdine, v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2001).
79. See Bright, supra note 76, at 1835.
80. Id. at 1837.
81. See Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1085 (2014) (trial attorney failed to seek
funding for expert because he was not aware that the law authorized such funding).
82. See Bright, supra note 76, at 1835–36.
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quence is that they may be wrongly convicted. Another consequence
of bad lawyering in capital cases is the possibility that the defendant
will be sentenced to death even though he should not be. There have
been numerous defendants who have been sentenced to death be-
cause their lawyers failed to present important mitigating evidence to
the jury.83 Incompetent trial lawyers also make it difficult for defend-
ants to receive appellate relief because they may fail to make timely
objections at trial, thereby relinquishing the ability to preserve error
for appeal.84
The Supreme Court attempted to address the problem of incom-
petent counsel in its decision in Strickland v. Washington.85 In Strick-
land, the Court held that in order to prevail on a claim that counsel
provided ineffective representation, the defendant must prove (1) the
counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that the defendant was
prejudiced as a result of counsel’s deficient performance.86 It is very
difficult for a defendant to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Even if the defendant can prove that counsel’s perform-
ance was deficient—which is no easy task—courts often reject claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel on grounds that the defendant did
not suffer prejudice.87
E. Other Factors
Several other factors have contributed to the loss of public confi-
dence in the administration of the death penalty.
i. Delay in Implementation
The few who are sentenced to death are not likely to be executed.
They are more likely to have their sentences overturned or die from
83. See e.g., Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 2002) (trial counsel failed to
present evidence during punishment phase of petitioner’s background—including his hor-
rid childhood of rejection, abandonment, and mental institutions, plus his tortuous prison
experience).
84. See e.g., Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“In order to
preserve error for appellate review a defendant must make a timely request, objection or
motion in the trial court (regardless of whether or not the error complained of is
constitutional).”).
85. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
86. Id. at 687.
87. See e.g., Kenneth Williams, Does Strickland Prejudice Defendants on Death Row?, 43 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1459, 1481-1485 (2009) (discussing the case of Johnny Ray Conner); Wesley
v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 714, 721 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that although trial counsel was defi-
cient for failing to review transcript of co-defendant’s trial, this failure did not prejudice
petitioner).
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natural causes than to be executed.88 “In a word, executions are
rare.”89 For the unlucky few who are executed, it takes on average of
approximately eighteen years to carry out.90 This delay is attributable
to a lengthy appellate process,91 which seeks to ensure reliability and
fairness before the ultimate punishment is meted out.92 However, the
lengthy delay in carrying out the death penalty undermines the peno-
logical justifications for the death penalty, specifically the deterrence
rationale.93 The question whether the death penalty actually deters is
uncertain.94 There are studies that both support and undermine the
deterrence rationale of the death penalty.95 Most would agree that, to
be an effective deterrent, executions have to be carried out swiftly.96
Public support has diminished as a result of the lengthy delays. There
is also no solution to the problem of lengthy delays as long as we are
committed to reliability and fairness. As Justice Breyer explained,
“[i]n this world, or at least in this Nation, we can have a death penalty
that at least arguably serves legitimate penological purposes or we can
have a procedural system that at least arguably seeks reliability and
fairness in the death penalty’s application. We cannot have both.”97
ii. Life Without Parole
In the past, jurors often voted for death in order to ensure that
dangerous defendants remained in jail and were never released on
88. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2768 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (emphasis in original).
90. Id. at 2770.
91. An inmate sentenced to death has a right to have his conviction and sentence
reviewed on direct appeal. Once his direct appeal has been concluded, he or she can file a
writ of habeas corpus in state court. If the state courts deny relief, the inmate can file a writ
of habeas corpus in federal court. See KENNETH WILLIAMS, MOST DESERVING OF DEATH? AN
ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE 111 (2012).
92. See generally Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act:
What’s Wrong With It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919, 921 (2001) (discussing the
basics of the writ of habeas corpus and direct review). Whether the appellate process actu-
ally accomplishes these objectives is certainly subject to debate because appellate courts are
often constrained in their ability to review the merits of an inmate’s appeals by doctrines
such as procedural default, harmless error, exhaustion, and—most importantly in the fed-
eral courts—by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214.
Id. at 924–927.
93. The Supreme Court has identified two penological justifications for the death
penalty: deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders and retribution. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
94. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2767–69 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. See e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 302 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
97. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2772 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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parole.98 Now that most states provide jurors with the option of sen-
tencing the defendant to life without parole (“LWOP”), this concern
is eliminated. As a result, jurors are meting out fewer death
sentences99 and the public seems to agree with those decisions. In a
recent poll, 52% of the public preferred LWOP, whereas 42% pre-
ferred the death penalty.100 Even among those who support the death
penalty, 29% preferred LWOP. The public is increasingly unwilling to
accept the risk of executing an innocent person now that they are
assured that the perpetrator will never be released from prison.
iii. Religion
There was a time when practically every organized religious de-
nomination supported capital punishment.101 That is no longer the
case. In fact, most major Christian denominations have announced
their opposition to capital punishment.102 Many non-Christian de-
nominations, such as reform Jews and Unitarian Universalists, have
also announced their opposition to capital punishment.103 The relig-
ious denomination that opposes the death penalty most aggressively
has been the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church’s opposition is
based on its belief in the sanctity of human life.104 Pope John Paul II
has stated that all human life deserves respect, “even [the lives] of
98. See Amanda Dowlen, An Analysis of Texas Capital Sentencing Procedure: Is Texas Deny-
ing Its Capital Defendants Due Process By Keeping Judges Uninformed of Parole Eligibility?, 29 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1111, 1134–1138 (1998).
99. By Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 4.
100. Damla Ergun, New Low in Preference for the Death Penalty, ABC NEWS (June 5, 2014),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/06/new-low-in-preference-for-the-death-pen-
alty/ [https://perma.cc/5CAQ-8BHD].
101. See generally Davison M. Douglas, God and the Executioner: The Influence of Western
Religion on the Death Penalty, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 137, 142–61 (2000) (providing a
history of organized religious denominations and their attitudes toward capital
punishment).
102. For information on religious denominations and their position on the death pen-
alty, see Religion and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. http://www.deathpenalty-
info.org/article.php%3Fdid%3D2249 (last visited Nov. 20, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
NG3A-JCEC]. Notable exceptions to the majority include the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints, which leaves the question up to “civil law;” The National Association of
Evangelicals, which supports both proponents and opponents of the death penalty; and
The Southern Baptist Association, which supports “fair and equitable use of” the death
penalty. Id.
103. Id. See also, Religious Groups Official Positions on Capital Punishment, PEW RE-
SEARCH CTR. (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.pewforum.org/2009/11/04/religious-groups-offi
cial-positions-on-capital-punishment/ [https://perma.cc/B4S3-65KK].
104. Thomas C. Berg, Religious Conservatives and the Death Penalty, 9 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 31, 42 (2000).
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criminals and unjust aggressors.”105 According to the Pope, since
human life “from the beginning . . . involved the ‘creative action of
God’ and remains forever in a special relationship with the Creator,
only God is the master of life.”106 Therefore, the government
ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in
cases of absolute necessity; in other words, when it would not be
possible otherwise to defend society. Today, however, as a result of
steady improvements in the organization of the penal system, such
cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent.107
These religious objections, especially the Catholic Church’s work
against the death penalty, have likely had an impact on the declining
support for the death penalty in the United States.108
II. Reform or Abolition?
A longtime federal judge, Alex Kozinski, recently wrote that there
are “reasons to doubt that our criminal justice system is fundamentally
just.”109 As some of the problems discussed in the previous section
illustrate, nowhere is his conclusion more evident than in the adminis-
tration of the death penalty. There is a consensus emerging across
ideological and political lines that the death penalty is seriously
flawed.110 This section discusses the option of continued reform and
why that option is likely to fail.
A. Reform
There have been numerous proposals to “fix” the death penalty.
Reform proposals have been made by academics,111 state commis-
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., Religious Reflections on the Death Penalty, PEW RE-
SEARCH CTR. (June 5, 2001), http://www.pewforum.org/2001/06/05/religious-reflections-
on-the-death-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/4ZHW-3FE9] (“I think the religious community
has played an enormous role in having people question their consciences’ about where
they stand on the death penalty. . . The pope’s visit to the United States had a powerful
influence on the Catholic community . . . in reconsidering their view.”).
109. Hon. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xiii
(2015).
110. See, e.g., CONSERVATIVES CONCERNED ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, http://conserva
tivesconcerned.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2016) [https://perma.cc/YXT6-QBK4].
111. See, e.g., Kenneth Williams, The Death Penalty: Can It be Fixed?, 51 CATH. U.L. REV.
1177, 1180–1203 (2002) (discussing various potential reforms to the death penalty, but
subsequently critiquing them).
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sions,112 and others to address many of the areas of concern outlined
in the previous section. Below is a review and assessment of some of
these proposals.
i. Race
An attempt to eliminate racial disparity in capital sentencing
failed at the Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp.113 Since then, two
major legislative proposals have been advanced in the attempt to elim-
inate racial disparities in capital sentencing.
First, in federal cases, a federal statute was enacted in 2013 that
attempts to eliminate racism in the jury deliberation process.114 This
statute requires that the judge instruct the jury at the end of the sen-
tencing phase of a capital case that they may not in any way consider
race, national origin, sex, or the religious beliefs of the defendant or
the victim in reaching its verdict.115 The same statute also requires
that after a verdict has been rendered, all jurors must certify that they
did not, in fact, consider the race, national origin, sex, or religious
beliefs of the defendant or the victim in reaching their determinations
and that their determinations would have been the same regardless of
these factors.116 Despite this statute, there continue to be racial dispar-
ities in the administration of the federal death penalty.117
112. See, e.g., Report of the Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment (April 15,
2002), http://illinoismurderindictments.law.northwestern.edu/docs/Illinois_Moratorium
_Commission_complete-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KY8-KXDJ] (presenting various
recommendations to reform the death penalty to Governor George Ryan of Illinois after a
moratorium on executions was declared).
113. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
114. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f) (2013).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. About 44% of federal death row inmates are black, 39% are white and 13% are
Latino. See Federal Death Row Inmates, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Mar. 24, 2016), http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-row-prisoners [https://perma.cc/DW4S-VTGL].
In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice studied the federal death penalty system and
found that, from 1988 to 2000, approximately 80% of the cases submitted by federal prose-
cutors for death penalty review involved racial minorities as defendants. See Report on the
Federal Death Penalty System: A Statistical Survey 1988-2000, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTOR-
NEY GEN. http://www.justice.gov/dag/survey-federal-death-penalty-system [https://perma
.cc/L9FS-D26C] (go to link titled “Table Set I: Statistical Overview”). About 73% of cases
approved for death penalty prosecution involved minority defendants. Id. The study also
found that U.S. Attorneys were almost twice as likely to recommend the death penalty for a
black defendant when the victim was non-black as when the victim was black. Id. (go to link
titled “Victims: Explanatory Notes For Table Set III.C”). The study further found that white
defendants were almost twice as likely as black, Hispanic, or other defendants to be offered
a plea agreement reducing the penalty from death to life imprisonment or less. See State-
ment of David C. Baldus to Hon. Russell D. Feingold, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
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The second legislative proposal to eliminate racial disparities in
the administration of the death penalty was the Racial Justice Act.118
Had the Racial Justice Act passed, it would have allowed defendants
who had been sentenced to death to use statistical evidence to demon-
strate a prima facie case of racial bias,119 something that the Supreme
Court did not permit in McCleskey.120 The burden then would have
shifted to the prosecution to explain the reason for the statistical dis-
parity.121 The reviewing court would then decide whether race was a
factor, and if it found that it was, the defendant’s death sentence
would be overturned.122 The Racial Justice Act would have required
an explanation from prosecutors when racial disparities existed.
Requiring an explanation from prosecutors is important:
It is not unreasonable to require publicly elected prosecutors to
justify racial disparities in capital prosecutions. If there is an under-
representation of black citizens in a jury pool, jury commissioners
are required to explain the disparity. A prosecutor who strikes a
disproportionate number of black citizens in selecting a jury is re-
quired to rebut the inference of discrimination by showing race
neutral reasons for his or her strikes. If there are valid, race neutral
explanations for the disparities in capital prosecutions, they should
be presented to the courts and public. Prosecutors, like other pub-
lic officials, should be held accountable for their actions. The bases
for critical decisions about whether to seek the death penalty and
whether to agree to a sentence less than death in exchange for a
guilty plea should not be shrouded in secrecy, but should be
openly set out, defended, and evaluated.123
Ultimately, the Racial Justice Act passed the U.S. House of Represent-
atives but failed to be acted upon by the U.S. Senate.124 Two states,
North Carolina and Kentucky, enacted versions of the Act.125 How-
ever, after a state judge overturned an inmate’s death sentence based
(June 11, 2001), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/86 [https://perma.cc/TW24-
ZAGG] (“48% of white defendants avoid the risk of a death penalty by entering a plea
agreement to a non-capital charge, while the rates that blacks and Hispanics enter such
agreements are 25% and 28% respectively.”).
118. Racial Justice Act, H.R. 4017, 103d Cong. § 2921 (2d Sess. 1994).
119. Williams, supra note 111, at 1182–83.
120. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
121. Williams, supra note 111, at 1183.
122. Id.
123. Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimi-
nation in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 465–66 (1995).
124. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the Death Penalty:
The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519, 530 (1995).
125. Williams, supra note 43, at 49.
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on the statute, the North Carolina legislature repealed its Racial Jus-
tice Act.126
Given these practical and political difficulties faced by Congress,
the prospects for any legislative reforms designed to address the prob-
lem of racial disparities in capital sentencing are bleak. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has always been unwilling to address the issue of
race and capital punishment.127 Even in the unlikely event that either
the Supreme Court or the legislature addressed the issue, it is ques-
tionable how much can be achieved in ending these disparities. The
United States has been grappling with the issue of race since its incep-
tion. Racism, however, is not a relic of the past. A federal appellate
court recently acknowledged “the sad truth that racism continues to
exist in our modern American society despite years of laws designed to
eradicate it.”128 As long as there continues to be significant racial
prejudice in society, it is difficult to imagine any reform capable of
eliminating the racial disparities that have always infected the highly-
charged decision whether to sentence an individual to death. Even
the Racial Justice Act, although well intended, would not have done
so. The Act was modeled after Batson and as discussed earlier, judges
have largely ignored obvious racism in jury selection.129 Therefore,
there is no reason to believe that the courts would do a better job
enforcing the Racial Justice Act, even if it were to be enacted.
ii. Innocence
There are several causes of wrongful convictions. Wrongful con-
victions often occur because of erroneous eyewitness testimony, which
has been described as “the single greatest cause of wrongful convic-
126. See Lane Florsheim, Four Inmates Might Return to Death Row Because North Carolina
Republicans Repealed a Racial Justice Law, NEW REPUBLIC (May 9, 2014), http://www.newre
public.com/article/117699/repeal-racial-justice-act-north-carolina-gop-takeover [https://
perma.cc/WK5C-8HBY]; North Carolina Racial Justice Act Repealed Shortly After First Use, AMER-
ICAN BAR ASS’N: DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION PROJECT, http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/project_press/2012/year-end/RJA_update_2012.html [https://perma.cc/
KH9F-34VL].
127. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 27.
128. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 499 (5th Cir. 2015); The recent questionable
shootings of numerous unarmed African-American men by police officers is another exam-
ple of the continued racism in American society despite the enactment of laws such as 18
U.S.C § 242 (1996) to prevent such shootings. For a discussion of police shootings of un-
armed African-American men, see Manny Fernandez, North Charleston Police Shooting
Not Justified, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/
10/us/north-charleston-police-shooting-not-justified-experts-say.html?_r=0 [https://perma
.cc/9AAA-FRXT].
129. See Edelman, supra note 50.
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tions in the U.S. criminal justice system.”130 Several factors cause wit-
nesses to misidentify suspects. First, the stress of witnessing a traumatic
event like murder may affect a witness’ perception.131 Second, wit-
nesses often make misidentifications when identifying persons of a dif-
ferent race.132 Third, the procedure used by law enforcement officers
may cause a witness to identify the wrong person.133 For instance, a
suggestive lineup could cause a misidentification.134 A lineup adminis-
tered by a police officer who is familiar with the suspect can also cause
misidentifications.135
Several proposals have been made to minimize the possibility of a
misidentification. One such proposal is that lineups be administered
by officers who are not involved in the investigation and who are not
familiar with the suspect.136 To address the problem of suggestive line-
ups, some have proposed that individuals in a lineup be presented
sequentially so that witnesses would not be able to compare and con-
trast the individuals in the lineup and pick the individual who most
resembles the suspect.137 Another potential source of misidentifica-
tion comes from the fact that witnesses often believe that the suspect
is part of the lineup and therefore feel pressure to pick someone in
the lineup as the perpetrator.138 Some have proposed informing wit-
nesses that the suspect may not be in the lineup to reduce this
pressure.139
Another cause of wrongful convictions is misconduct by prosecu-
tors and police. In Brady v. Maryland,140 the Supreme Court held that
prosecutors were constitutionally required to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence to the defense, but they often fail to fulfill this duty. According
to federal appeals court Judge Alex Kozinski, there is an “epidemic of
Brady violations abroad in the land.”141 To deal with the problem of
prosecutorial misconduct, Judge Kozinski believes that open file dis-
130. Rob Warden, How Mistaken Perjured Eyewitness Identification Testimony Put 46 Inno-
cent Americans on Death Row (May 2, 2001), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/StudyCWC
2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/CMQ2-V25T].
131. Williams, supra note 43, at 64.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-284-52(b).
137. Williams, supra note 43, at 91.
138. See Williams, supra note 43, at 64.
139. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284-52(b)(3)(A) (2007).
140. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
141. Kozinski, supra note 109, at viii.
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covery142 should be required.143 Thus, if open file discovery is re-
quired, prosecutors would be obligated to disclose any evidence
bearing on the crime with which a defendant is being charged, not
just exculpatory evidence.144 Others have proposed that prosecutors
should be disciplined more frequently and harshly when they engage
in misconduct.145 Separately, but related, police sometimes extract
false confessions from suspects. To address that problem, some have
opined that police interrogations should be videotaped.146
A major impediment to preventing prosecutorial and police mis-
conduct is that there are no incentives for either prosecutors or police
officers to play by the rules. Prosecutors and police are rarely prose-
cuted even when they have been found to have engaged in miscon-
duct.147 Although prosecutors can be disciplined by the state bar
association, this rarely occurs.148 Furthermore, the standard for over-
turning a conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct or police
overreaching is extremely high. The defendant not only has to prove
that the violation occurred but also must prove that the evidence re-
sulting from prosecutorial or police misconduct was not harmless.149
Most defendants are unable to prove that the misconduct affected the
outcome of their case.150 Barring a complete overhaul of the discipli-
nary system governing prosecutors, small reforms are unlikely to cur-
tail these problems.
142. Open file discovery allows defendants to review the prosecution’s case files. See,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903 (1973).
143. Kozinski, supra note 109, at xxvi–xxvii.
144. Id.
145. See Williams, supra note 111, at 1200–01.
146. Id. at 1202.
147. For a discussion of the difficulty of holding prosecutor’s accountable for miscon-
duct, including a rare instance in Texas in which a prosecutor was prosecuted for miscon-
duct, see Matt Ferner, Prosecutors Are Almost Never Disciplined For Misconduct,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/prosecutor-mis-
conduct-justice_us_56bce00fe4b0c3c55050748a [https://perma.cc/Z5X8-2DR9].
148. See e.g., Martha Bellisle, Despite misconduct, prosecutors rarely face discipline,
WASH. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/aug/3/de-
spite-misconduct-prosecutors-rarely-face-discipl/ [https://perma.cc/3JJT-LG39] (accord-
ing to a study, “The California Bar Association disciplined 1 percent of the prosecutors in
600 cases where misconduct was found.”).
149. See United States v. Bagley, 437 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
150. The Center for Public Integrity found that “in thousands [of] cases, judges la-
beled prosecutorial behavior inappropriate but allowed the trial to continue or upheld
convictions using a doctrine called ‘harmless error.’” Steve Weinberg, Breaking the Rules:
Who Suffers When a Prosecutor is Cited for Misconduct? CTR. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (June
26, 2003), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2003/06/26/5517/breaking-rules [https://per
ma.cc/VW3D-Z9K9].
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iii. Bad Defense Lawyers
Wrongful convictions in capital cases also occur because of inef-
fective defense counsel. Defendants who should not be sentenced to
death often end up on death row because they were not competently
represented.151 The obvious remedy would be for jurisdictions to pro-
vide greater resources for defense counsel. As Justice Hugo Black ob-
served, “[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a
[person] gets depends on the amount of money he has.”152 If more
resources were provided for defense counsel, better lawyers would get
involved and handle the cases. However, this is unlikely to happen.
During a time in which many jurisdictions are strapped for cash and
have difficulties providing adequate funding for basic services, such as
education and infrastructure repairs, how likely is it that they will have
the political courage to propose and defend increases in spending for
indigent criminal defendants?
The courts, including the Supreme Court, have been unwilling to
heavily regulate the problem of ineffective defense counsel in capital
cases. They give great deference to any decision that defense counsel
makes no matter how nonsensical it may have been as long as defense
counsel can frame it as a strategic decision.153 Furthermore, even
when defense counsel fails to present obviously mitigating evidence
that could have saved a defendant’s life, the courts will often refuse to
grant relief on the grounds that the defendant suffered no prejudice
from the failure of defense counsel to utilize the evidence.154
iv. Arbitrariness
The Supreme Court has labored unsuccessfully to rid the death
penalty of arbitrariness through various reforms. In 1972, the Su-
preme Court invalidated the death penalty because of concerns that it
was too arbitrarily imposed.155 After reinstating the death penalty in
151. See Bright, supra note 76 (emphasizing that this phenomenon particularly harms
poorer defendants).
152. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
153. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1407 (2011) (explaining that a court
is “required not simply to give [the] attorneys the benefit of the doubt, but to affirmatively
entertain the range of possible reasons [the petitioner’s] counsel may have had for pro-
ceeding as they did.”)
154. See, e.g., Stephen Henderson, Bad Defense Often Slides in Death Cases, NEWS &
OBSERVER, Jan. 21, 2007, at A1 (describing a study of eighty death penalty cases from Ala-
bama, Georgia, Mississippi, and Virginia regarding the poor quality of legal representation
in death penalty cases and the failure of appellate courts to reverse convictions in most of
those cases).
155. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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1976,156 the Court has regulated it in an attempt to minimize arbitrari-
ness and limit the penalty to the “worst of the worst.”157 In attempting
to limit the arbitrary application of the death penalty, death sentences
are automatically appealed. In addition, trials are bifurcated into two
separate phases: (1) guilt-innocence and (2) punishment.158 In the
second phase, the Court has mandated a broad right to individualized
sentencing to permit capital defendants to invoke any relevant
grounds supporting a non-death sentence.159 The Court has also lim-
ited the offenses punishable by death by exempting non-homicidal
crimes.160 Further, the Court has categorically excluded certain vul-
nerable groups, such as juveniles161 and intellectually disabled offend-
ers,162from the penalty’s reach. Notwithstanding these changes, the
death penalty continues to be fraught with arbitrariness. Factors such
as geography, race, resources, and quality of defense counsel continue
to matter more than the heinousness of the crime in determining
whether an inmate is sentenced to death.163
The Court can continue its current attempt to regulate the death
penalty instead of abolishing it outright. As discussed earlier,164 the
Supreme Court has attempted to reform the death penalty on multi-
ple occasions. But, these reforms have not produced a fairer death
penalty. There are still serious racial disparities despite Batson;165 the
death penalty is still not confined to the worst offenders despite the
Supreme Court’s attempts to do so;166 and capital defendants are still
frequently represented by incompetent defense counsel despite the
Court’s decision in Strickland.167
156. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
157. See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting); Godfrey
v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432–33 (1980) (“[I]t is of vital importance to the defendant and
to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be,
based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.” (inner quotations omitted)).
158. See, e.g., Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 276–77 (2004) (referring to the second
phase as the “penalty phase” after a jury conviction).
159. See id. at 284–85 (2004).
160. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (prohibiting the death penalty
for the rape of a child); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (prohibiting the death
penalty for the rape of an adult woman).
161. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
162. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
163. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
164. See supra Part II.
165. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See supra Part I.B.
166. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2760 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2761.
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Any future effort to reform the death penalty is similarly unlikely
to succeed. The failure of the aforementioned reforms will likely lead
to a continued marginalization of the death penalty. Although death
penalty statutes may remain on the books in several states, death
sentences will rarely be imposed in the vast majority of states.168 In
these states, despite the dwindling number of executions, the death
penalty will continue to be “fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination,
caprice, and mistake.”169 Individuals who do not deserve to die will
continue to be sentenced to death and executed. There is also the
possibility that an individual who is completely innocent will be
executed.
Taking these pervasive structural problems of the criminal justice
system into consideration, the Supreme Court should finally admit
that Justice Blackmun was right in 1994 when he said that “no combi-
nation of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can save the
death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies”170 and
abolish the death penalty.
B. Abolition
There are several grounds upon which the Supreme Court could
declare the death penalty unconstitutional. The Court would not have
to create new constitutional doctrines in order to do so. The Court
could rely upon existing death penalty jurisprudence that it has devel-
oped since 1976.
i. Equal Protection
The strongest—but least likely—way the Court could invalidate
the death penalty is by using the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause generally prohibits
the government from discriminating against its citizens without a legit-
imate reason for doing so. In the event that a law discriminates on the
basis of race, the government must put forth a compelling reason to
168. For instance, despite having the death penalty on the books, New Hampshire has
carried out zero executions since 1976; Colorado has carried out one; Wyoming, one;
United States Military, zero. Pennsylvania, which has 175 death row inmates, has carried
out three executions. California, which has the largest death row population, 741, has exe-
cuted only thirteen inmates since 1976 and none since 2006. State by State Database,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last visited
Dec. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/3EH8-PEWV].
169. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1145.
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justify the discrimination.171 If the government fails to do so, the law
violates equal protection and will be struck down.172 To prove an
equal protection violation, it is not necessary that a law discriminate
explicitly on the basis of race.173 An equal protection violation also
occurs if the law is applied in a discriminatory manner.174 However, in
order to trigger this “strict scrutiny,” proof of a racially discriminatory
purpose is usually required.175 The Supreme Court has not allowed
equal protection violations to be proven only with evidence that a law
disproportionately burdens members of a particular racial group.176
For much of the nation’s history, death penalty statutes were ex-
plicitly racist and were applied in a racially discriminatory manner.177
Blacks could be—and were—executed for crimes that whites could
not be.178 Blacks often were also executed more gruesomely than
whites.179 During the modern era of capital punishment, death pen-
alty statutes are no longer explicitly discriminatory. In fact, as dis-
cussed earlier, there have been measures implemented to ensure that
racial discrimination does not infect the decision-making process in
death penalty cases.180 However, racial disparities in the administra-
tion of the death penalty persist. African-Americans are sentenced to
death at a higher ratio than warranted given their percentage of the
population.181 In addition, killers of whites are significantly more
likely to be sentenced to death than killers of African-Americans.182
Furthermore, discriminatory jury selection continues to occur in capi-
tal cases despite the Supreme Court’s attempt to remedy the prob-
lem.183 Because African-Americans are not treated equally when the
death penalty is sought and carried out, a claim could be made that
171. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003).
172. Id.
173. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 240 (“[T]he invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory
must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”).
176. Id. at 239 (“But our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other
official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is uncon-
stitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.” (emphasis in original)).
177. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 27, at 248–253.
178. Id. at 248.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f) (2013).
181. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 28; Race, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra
note 30.
182. See Race, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 30; Uniform Crime Report, supra note
32.
183. See Edeleman, supra note 50.
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the death penalty violates equal protection and is therefore
unconstitutional.
The requirement of proving a discriminatory purpose would be
one significant hurdle in declaring the death penalty unconstitutional
on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Warren McCleskey produced
statistical evidence to support his claim that because he was a black
man accused of killing a white victim, he was more likely to be sen-
tenced to death and thus a violation of equal protection had oc-
curred.184 However, he was not able to produce evidence that when
the Georgia legislature enacted its death penalty statute, it did so with
a racially discriminatory purpose.185 He also could not produce evi-
dence that the decisionmakers in his case—either the judge, jury, or
prosecutor—purposely discriminated against him.186 The Court held
that without such proof, his equal protection claim failed.187
Should the Supreme Court accept statistics of the racially discrim-
inatory impact of capital punishment it would require the Court to
overrule its previous decisions disallowing evidence of discriminatory
impact as proof of an equal protection violation.188 The Court is not
likely to begin this practice because of the impact such a decision
would have—not only on the death penalty and the criminal justice
system—in other areas of American life.189
The Court, however, would not have to go this far in order to find
that the current administration of the death penalty violates equal
protection. Since 1976, the Court has said that “death is different,”190
which justifies applying different standards in death penalty cases.191
184. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 288 (1987).
185. Id. at 298–99.
186. Id. at 292–93.
187. Id. at 299.
188. See e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
189. For instance, in McCleskey, the Court expressed its concern that “if we accept Mc-
Cleskey’s claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision,
we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty.” McCleskey, 481 U.
S. at 315 (1987).
190. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303–04 (1976) (“death is a punish-
ment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree.”) (citing Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286–291 (1976)) (Brennan, J., concurring).
191. For instance, the Court requires that in capital cases, the sentencer be empowered
to take into account all mitigating circumstances, see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978); prohibits death as a mandatory punishment for murder, see Woodson, 428 U.S.
305; requires that the sentencer not be given unguided discretion, see Furman, 408 U.S.
238 (1972); that the accused receive a judicial evaluation of his claim of insanity before the
sentence can be executed, see Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410–11 1986); that the
accused receive a judicial evaluation of his claim of intellectual disability, see Hall v. Florida,
134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014); that the death penalty cannot be imposed for rape, see Coker
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The Court has also allowed statistical evidence to prove a claim of dis-
crimination in jury selection, a claim intertwined with capital punish-
ment.192 Thus, by applying its “death is different” jurisprudence, the
Court could accept statistics as proof of discriminatory purpose in
death penalty cases only, while leaving intact its previous decisions re-
jecting similar evidence as proof of equal protection violations in
other cases.
Although the Court could use its current jurisprudence to find
that the death penalty violates equal protection, it is unlikely to do so.
Since at least the 1960’s, litigants have sought to engage the court in
issues concerning the racial application of the death penalty.193 De-
spite these efforts, the Court has given the issue of race little atten-
tion.194 For instance, the death penalty had always been imposed
more frequently in cases involving black defendants accused of rape
and especially when these defendants were accused of raping white
women.195 The NAACP Legal Defense Fund (“LDF”) tried unsuccess-
fully to convince the Court to accept certiorari in cases where black
defendants had been accused of raping white women.196 The Court
consistently declined to do so.197
The Court did eventually grant certiorari on the issue of whether
the death penalty could be imposed for rape. The case it accepted
involved a white defendant and white victim.198 Briefs filed with the
Court, including briefs by the LDF and the National Organization for
Women, still urged the Court to strike down the practice because of
the disproportionate use of the death penalty in rape cases against
black men.199 However, in its opinion finding the death penalty for
rape unconstitutional, the Court did not address the issue of race.200
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); nor for ordinary murder, see Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420, 433 (1980).
192. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93–94 (1986).
193. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 27, at 253–77 (detailing attempts from litigants
such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to convince the Court to accept certiorari and
address some of the racial issues surrounding the death penalty. The Court avoided the
issue of race and decided the cases on other grounds).
194. Id. at 253.
195. Id. at 273–77.
196. Id. at 276.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 280.
199. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 27 at 274.
200. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Even Justice Marshall avoided the issue
of race in his concurring opinion. Id. at 600–01 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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The Court instead relied on the Eighth Amendment in striking down
the death penalty for rape.201
Similarly, briefs filed with the Court in Furman v. Georgia202 urged
it to strike down the death penalty because of its racially discrimina-
tory application.203 The Court did strike down the death penalty in
Furman, however, the decision was not based on race.204 The Court
also ignored the issue of race when it re-imposed the death penalty in
Gregg v. Georgia205 despite the fact that the briefs filed with the Court
had discussed the issue at length.206
More recently, Justice Sotomayor has urged the Court to have an
honest discussion about race when she wrote:
The refusal to accept the stark reality that race matters is regretta-
ble. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak
openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Con-
stitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of
racial discrimination.207
However, there is no evidence to suggest that the Court is willing
to acknowledge the role that race plays in the imposition of the death
penalty. Justice Breyer, for instance, did not specifically list race as a
reason for the Court to revisit the death penalty and he only briefly
mentioned the racial disparities in his Glossip dissent.208 Based on the
Court’s longstanding reluctance to discuss the issue of race and capi-
tal punishment, there is no reason to be optimistic that will change in
the near future. If the Court decides to strike down the death penalty
it is likely to do so as the Constitutional Court of South Africa did, not
on explicit racial grounds, but with race in the backdrop of its
decision.209
201. Id. at 592.
202. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
203. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 27, at 263–65.
204. Id. at 265–67.
205. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153.
206. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 27, at 269–72.
207. Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1676 (2014).
208. Justice Breyer stated that the Court should reconsider its holding in Gregg for
three reasons: (1) serious unreliability of the death penalty; (2) arbitrariness in applica-
tion; and (3) unconscionably long delays that undermine the death penalty’s penological
purpose. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–56 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In
one paragraph of his dissent, he cites studies indicating that individuals accused of murder-
ing whites are more likely to receive the death penalty as proof of the arbitrary application
of the death penalty. Id. at 2760–61.
209. Although the South African Constitutional Court based its ruling abolishing the
death penalty on the right to life provision of its new constitution, the fact
[t]hat the Constitutional Court chose the death penalty issue for its first major
ruling underscored the importance of the issue in a country where for decades
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ii. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
If the Court is to strike down the death penalty, the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment provides
the best vehicle. In its past decisions, the Court has acknowledged that
the death penalty would be unconstitutional if “inflicted in an arbi-
trary and capricious manner.”210 To strike down the death penalty,
the Court could rely upon research that strongly “suggests that the
death penalty is imposed arbitrarily.”211 The first indication of an arbi-
trary death penalty lies in the high number of death row inmates
whom have been wrongly sentenced to death.212 Second, as discussed
earlier, there is an abundance of evidence that the factors such as
race, geography, gender, and resources play a big role in determining
who is sentenced to death.213 Finally, in accepting that the egregious-
ness of the crime largely does not correlate with a death sentence,214
the Court would have to acknowledge that its attempts to limit the
death penalty to the “worst of the worst” have failed and there is noth-
ing that it can do going forward to succeed in this endeavor.
The Court has also held that the death penalty would be cruel
and unusual punishment in the event that it failed to serve a penologi-
cal purpose.215 A strong argument can be made that the current ad-
ministration of the death penalty fails to serve a penological purpose.
The argument that the death penalty serves as a deterrent has been
long debated.216 Scholars generally agree that the deterrent value of
the death penalty is dependent upon sentencing that is frequent,
swift, and provides some level of certainty as to which offenders will
execution was used not just as a weapon against common crime, but as a means of
terror in enforcing the system of racial separation known as apartheid.
Howard W. French, South Africa’s Supreme Court Abolishes Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES
(June 7, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/07/world/south-africa-s-supreme-
court-abolishes-death-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/N6XF-WF54].
210. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188.
211. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2762 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 2758.
213. Id. at 2760.
214. Id. at 2762.
215. The Court has said that if the death penalty doesn’t serve the goals of either deter-
rence or retribution, “It is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of
pain and suffering and hence an unconstitutional punishment.” Edmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (inner quotations omitted). See also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183
(“[S]anction imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification that it results in
the gratuitous infliction of suffering.”).
216. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal Reasoning
on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 255–62 (2006).
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receive the punishment.217 The deterrence rationale, however, is un-
dermined by the fact that only a small number of murderers are actu-
ally sentenced to death.218 The deterrence rationale is further
undermined by the long delays in carrying out the death penalty. An
individual contemplating whether to commit a capital crime is not
likely to be deterred by the prospect of being executed many years
later.
Retribution is another acceptable penological purpose that the
death penalty could serve.219 Many argue that the death penalty
should be retained as a punishment for the “worst of the worst.” How-
ever, the retributive justification is undermined by the fact that death
sentences are frequently not meted out to the most egregious kill-
ers.220 The retribution theory does not comport with evidence indicat-
ing that the individuals frequently sentenced to death are not the
worst killers in society and, therefore, are not as deserving of death.
The long delays221 in carrying out the death penalty further under-
mine the retributive rationale for the death penalty.
The death penalty does, however, serve one penological pur-
pose—incapacitation. A killer who is executed can no longer kill
again. However, it is not necessary to execute the offender in order to
prevent him from killing again. A sentence of life without parole is
adequate if the goal is to protect society. As the Catholic Church ac-
knowledges, the execution of a killer is not necessary for public safety:
“As a result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal
system, such cases [executions to protect society] are very rare, if prac-
217. See Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 783–84 (2010).
218. See Arbitrariness, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ar-
bitrariness (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/265G-2QQG] (“[L]ess than 2% of
known murderers are sentenced to death.”).
219. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
220. For example, Justice Breyer questioned the randomness of death penalty
sentences meted out for various crimes in his Glossip dissent:
I see discrepancies for which I can find no rational explanations . . . Why does
one defendant who committed a single-victim murder receive the death penalty
. . . while another defendant does not, despite having kidnapped, raped, and
murdered a young mother while leaving her infant baby to die at the scene of the
crime . . . For that matter, why does one defendant who participated in a single-
victim murder-for-hire scheme (plus an after-the-fact robbery) receive the death
penalty, while another defendant does not, despite having stabbed his wife 60
times and killed his 6-year-old daughter and 3-year-old son while they slept?
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2763 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 2769 (“[E]xecutions occur, on average, after nearly two decades on death
row.”).
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tically nonexistent.”222 In light of this reality, the death penalty is the
type of gratuitous punishment that the Eighth Amendment does not
allow. The Court could use the fact that the death penalty fails to serve
any penological purpose as grounds for holding the death penalty un-
constitutional. The Court did just that in both Roper v. Simmons223
(holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of
juveniles) and in Atkins v. Virginia224 (holding that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibited the execution of intellectually disabled inmates).
The Eighth Amendment also prohibits excessive punishments.
The Court has used its “evolving standards of decency” doctrine to
determine whether certain punishments are excessive.225 The “evolv-
ing standards of decency” doctrine is a recognition “that the words of
the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise and their scope is not
static.”226 According to the Court, “[t]he Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society.”227 In determining whether a particular
punishment is in conflict with evolving standards of decency, the
Court looks to whether there is objective evidence of a national con-
sensus condemning the punishment.228 In Roper v. Simmons,229 the
Court applied its evolving standards of decency doctrine and deter-
mined there was a national consensus against executing juveniles.230
The Court pointed to several objective indicia of a national consensus
against executing juveniles. First, the Court considered the fact that,
at the time of its decision, thirty states prohibited the execution of
juveniles.231 Second, even in the twenty states that allowed juveniles to
be executed, the practice was infrequent.232 The Court also indicated
that, in determining whether a national consensus existed, “[i]t is not
so much the number of these States [that prohibit juvenile execu-
tions] that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of
222. Berg, supra note 104, at 42 (quoting Pope John Paul II).
223. Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
224. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
225. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
226. Id. at 100–01.
227. Id. at 101.
228. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592–93 (1977).
229. Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
230. Id. at 568.
231. Id. at 564.
232. Id. at 564–65.
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change.”233 In this regard, the Court found significant the fact that no
state had reinstated the death penalty for juveniles.234
The Court in Roper pointed to other evidence of the consensus
against executing juveniles. The Court has long considered the opin-
ions of the civilized nations of the world in determining whether a
punishment comports with the evolving standards of decency.235 In
Roper, the Court pointed out “the stark reality that the United States is
the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction of
the juvenile death penalty.”236 The Court emphasized that the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child contained an express
prohibition on capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles
under eighteen and that this Convention was further evidence of a
broad international consensus against executing juveniles.237
The Court used similar evidence of a national consensus in hold-
ing that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the death penalty for in-
tellectually disabled inmates.238 At the time of its Atkins decision,
there were also over thirty states that prohibited the death penalty for
intellectually disabled inmates;239 the movement was strongly in the
direction away from allowing such executions;240 the practice was
rare;241 and there was a consensus among professional and religious
organizations that intellectually disabled inmates should not be
executed.242
The Court’s evolving standards of decency test could lead to the
conclusion that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment. Al-
though thirty-one states, the federal government, and the U.S. military
still authorize the death penalty,243 this figure is misleading. Four of
these states have Governor-imposed moratoriums on executions.244
Two other states and the U.S. military have not executed anyone dur-
233. Id. at 566.
234. Id.
235. See e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–103 (1958) (“The civilized nations of the
world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for
crime.”).
236. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
237. Id. at 576.
238. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313–16 (2002).
239. See id. at 313–315.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 316 (“Moreover, even in those States that allow the execution of [intellectu-
ally disabled] offenders, the practice is uncommon.”).
242. Id. at 316, n. 21.
243. See States, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 10.
244. Id.
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ing the modern era of capital punishment.245 Nine other states and
the federal government have not carried out an execution in at least
ten years.246 Several other states have small death rows and the death
penalty is rarely sought in these states.247 Therefore, more than half of
the states have either formally abolished the death penalty or have
done so in practice.
Only a small number of states continue to sentence inmates to
death and carry out executions.248 However, even in these states, the
use of the death penalty is in decline.249 Furthermore, even in the
small number of active death penalty states, death sentences are typi-
cally meted out in only a few counties within the state.250 Most impor-
tantly, the Court in its recent Eighth Amendment decisions has
deemphasized the sheer number of states that authorize a challenged
practice and instead emphasized the direction of change.251 The
movement is clearly in the direction of abolition. Numerous states
have abolished the death penalty during the last ten years.252 Voters in
California, however, refused to abolish the death penalty in the No-
vember 2016 election.253 Despite this setback, the Court’s criteria still
definitively points toward abolition.
245. Kansas and New Hampshire have not executed a defendant since before 1976,
despite having the death penalty available. See Jurisdictions with no recent executions,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/jurisdictions-no-recent-ex-
ecutions (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/A3BE-SLJJ].
246. Id. (listing Arkansas, California, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Or-
egon, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming).
247. Idaho, for example, currently has only nine death row inmates. Death Row In-
mates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (July 1, 2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo
.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year?scid=9&did=188 [https://perma.cc/
R3V2-77XN].
248. The more active death penalty states include Texas, Florida, Missouri, Georgia,
Oklahoma, Virginia, and California. While California continues to sentence a large num-
ber of inmates to death, it has not carried out an execution in more than ten years. For
information on death sentences, see By Year, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CTR., supra note
4. For information on executions, see Executions by State, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CTR., supra note 71.
249. See Williams, supra note 6.
250. See Executions by County, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Jan. 1, 2011) http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-county [https://perma.cc/TZ6R-K99U] (“[Fifteen]
counties accounted for 30% of the executions in the U.S. between 1976 and January 1,
2013.”).
251. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002) (“It is not so much the number of
these states that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”).
252. For information on states that have abolished the death penalty, see States, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 10.
253. For analysis of the vote, see McPhate, supra note 10.
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Additional objective evidence of the movement away from the
death penalty is abundant. First, in striking down the death penalty
for juveniles and intellectually disabled inmates, the Court empha-
sized the fact that the practices had become so rare.254 As discussed
earlier,255 there has been a significant decline in death sentences over
the last fifteen years.256 Second, several respected professional and re-
ligious organizations support the abolition of the death penalty or im-
posing a moratorium on executions. Most notably, the American Law
Institute has withdrawn the death penalty provision of the Model Pe-
nal Code.257 Third, several former and present Justices have publicly
called attention to the problems in the administration of the death
penalty.258 Fourth, in its Eighth Amendment decisions, the Court has
considered the opinions of the international community with respect
to a particular practice.259 In this regard, most nations in the world
community have abolished the death penalty either by law or in prac-
tice.260 The United States’ use of the death penalty has isolated it from
the international community. For instance, many nations will not ex-
tradite criminal suspects to the United States without an assurance
that the suspect will not be sentenced to death.261 In addition, several
nations have challenged the United States’ attempt to execute their
citizens.262
The Court has also indicated that although evidence of a national
consensus is important, it does not wholly determine whether a partic-
ular practice violates the Eighth Amendment. Rather, the Court has
stated that
254. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
255. See supra Part I.
256. See By Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 4.
257. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, No More Tinkering: The American Law Insti-
tute and the Death Penalty Provisions of the Model Penal Code, 89 TEX. L. REV. 353, 359–360
(2010).
258. See Jeffries, supra note 64; Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 81 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
259. See e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–76 (2005).
260. According to Amnesty International, approximately two thirds of the countries
around the world have abolished the death penalty. See Death Sentences and Executions
Report 2015, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/
death-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/SW5G-JEKX].
261. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) (holding
that United Kingdom could not extradite murder suspect to the United States because of
death row phenomenon).
262. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U. S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 1
(Mar. 31) (holding that United States violated international law by sentencing fifty-four
Mexican nationals to death without providing them with notification of their rights to com-
municate with their consulates prior to trial).
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the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment
will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment . . . . Thus, in cases
involving a consensus, our own judgment is ‘brought to bear,’ [ci-
tation omitted] by asking whether there is reason to disagree with
the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.263
Given the risk of wrongful convictions and executions, the Court
would have no reason to disagree with the public’s movement away
from capital punishment.
III. Objections to Abolition
Three major objections are likely to be made to the Supreme
Court invalidating the death penalty. The first, and probably strong-
est, objection will be that the text of the Constitution allows the death
penalty to be imposed.264 As Justice Scalia argues, “[i]t is impossible to
hold unconstitutional that which the Constitution explicitly contem-
plates.”265 In support of his position, Justice Scalia specifically refers to
the Fifth Amendment which provides that “[n]o person shall be held
to answer for a capital . . . crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
ment of a Grand Jury,” and which also provides that no person shall
be “deprived of life . . . without due process of law.”266 These two
provisions in the Constitution, it will be argued, make it clear that the
Framers did not intend to prohibit capital punishment when it en-
acted the Eighth Amendment. In Scalia’s view of the Eighth Amend-
ment, it was enacted only to prohibit those punishments that added
“terror, pain, or disgrace” to an otherwise permissible capital
sentence.267
There are a couple of major flaws in the argument that the death
penalty is constitutional because of the Fifth Amendment. First, the
Fifth Amendment does not confer power onto the state. Rather it lim-
its the power of the state by requiring certain procedural safeguards.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “amendment does not, after all, de-
clare the right of the Congress to punish capitally shall be inviolable;
it merely requires that when and if death is a possible punishment, the
defendant shall enjoy certain procedural safeguards, such as indict-
263. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312–13 (2002).
264. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976) (“It is apparent from the text of the
Constitution itself that the existence of capital punishment was accepted by the Framers.”).
265. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
266. Id.
267. Id.
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ment by grand jury and, of course, due process.”268 Second, those who
use the Fifth Amendment to argue that the death penalty is constitu-
tional fail to explain why it should trump the Eighth Amendment. For
instance, the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment
seems to contemplate the taking of limbs as punishment: “[N]or shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb.”269 Wouldn’t the Eighth Amendment prohibit the tak-
ing of limbs even though it is contemplated in the Fifth Amendment?
How the Court resolves the issue of whether the text of the Con-
stitution constrains it from abolishing the death penalty will also de-
pend on whether a majority of the Court views the Constitution as a
“living document” or whether a majority believes that strict adherence
to the text of the Constitution is required.270 Proponents of a “living
constitution” believe that it “evolves, changes over time, and adapts to
new circumstances, without being formally amended.”271 They believe
that the world has changed in ways that the Framers could not have
foreseen and therefore the Constitution cannot be restricted to the
world that the Framers faced.272 On the other hand, those who believe
in strict adherence to the text of the Constitution, “originalists,” be-
lieve that the text of the Constitution should be given the meaning
that it bore when it was adopted.273 According to originalists, the Con-
stitution is supposed to be an embodiment of our most fundamental
principles.274 Public opinion, they say, will change but our basic con-
stitutional principles must remain constant.275 Otherwise, an original-
ist would ask, why have a Constitution at all?276 An originalist believes
that if the Constitution changes at all, it should be through the people
by way of a constitutional amendment as the Constitution provides.277
The Supreme Court has confronted the issue of whether the Con-
stitution is an evolving document and a majority of the Supreme
268. William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from
the Court, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 313, 323–24 (1986).
269. U.S. Const. amend. V.
270. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution (2010), http://www.law.uchica
go.edu/alumni/magazine/fall10/strauss [https://perma.cc/M4RZ-4L26].
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See Strauss, supra note 270.
277. See Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars
(Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/boisi/pdf/Symposia/
Symposia%202010-2011/Constitutional_Interpretation_Scalia.pdf [https://perma.cc/7M
R7-ZXND].
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Court has come down squarely on the “living constitution” side. The
Court in N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning,278 in deciding the limits to the Pres-
ident’s recess appointments power under the Constitution, declared
that:
The Founders knew they were writing a document designed to ap-
ply to ever-changing circumstances over centuries. After all, a Con-
stitution is ‘intended to endure for ages to come’ and must adapt
itself to a future that can only be ‘seen dimly,’ if at all. [citation
omitted] We therefore think the Framers likely did intend the
Clause to apply to a new circumstance that so clearly falls within its
essential purposes, where doing so is consistent with the Clause’s
language.279
In other decisions, the Court has made clear that it believes that
the interpretation of the Constitution should evolve over time.280 For
instance, the text of the Constitution does not address discrimination
based on sexual orientation—an uncontemplated issue when the
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted—yet the Court has decided that
the Constitution protects the right of gays and lesbians to marry.281
There are other reasons for rejecting the Framers’ view of the
constitutionality of the death penalty. How the death penalty is admin-
istered today is very different from the death penalty that the Framers
administered. There is no evidence to suggest that the Framers were
aware that mistakes were being made in sentencing defendants to
death. Today, we have been made well aware of the flaws in the ad-
ministration of the death penalty. The Framers were also likely not
aware of the arbitrary application of the death penalty. At common
law, for instance, all felonies were punishable by death.282 Today we
are well aware that receiving the death penalty is about as arbitrary as
being struck by lightning.283 Furthermore, the Framers did not have
to deal with the long delays in carrying out executions that typically
278. N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
279. Id. at 2564–65.
280. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (in deciding whether
the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to permit same sex couples to marry the Court
stated “[h]istory and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer
boundaries.”).
281. See id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is unquestionable that the people who
ratified [the Fourteenth Amendment] did not understand it to prohibit a practice that
remained both universal and uncontroversial in the years after ratification.”).
282. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976).
283. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“These
death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightening is
cruel and unusual.”).
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occur today and the suffering that accompanies these long delays.284
Finally, the death penalty was a widely acceptable practice around the
world when the Constitution was enacted.285 Presently, a majority of
the international community no longer views the death penalty as an
acceptable punishment.286 Therefore, these changing circumstances
warrant a different interpretation of the Eighth Amendment from
that of the Framers. An interpretation by the Court that the Eighth
Amendment now prohibits capital punishment would be consistent
with the Amendment’s essential purposes and text.
Justice Scalia articulated the second objection to the Supreme
Court abolishing capital punishment. The death penalty is an issue
that should be left to the American people to decide:
The American people have determined that the good to be derived
from capital punishment—in deterrence, and perhaps most of all
in the meting out of condign justice for horrible crimes—out-
weighs the risk of error. It is no proper part of the business of this
Court, or of its Justices, to second guess that judgment, much less
to impugn it before the world, and less still to frustrate it by impos-
ing judicially invented obstacles to its execution.287
Thus, according to Justice Scalia, individual states should be free to
decide whether to retain or abolish capital punishment and they
should even have autonomy in carrying it out with almost no interfer-
ence from the Court.
284. See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Nor can
one justify lengthy delays by reference to constitutional tradition, for our Constitution was
written at a time when delay between sentencing and execution could be measured in days
or weeks, not decades.”).
285. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, Death Penalty: An American History 5 (2002).
286. The vast majority of nations have abolished the death penalty. For a list of nations
that have abolished the death penalty, see Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, Death
Penalty Info. Ctr. (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/abolitionist-and-reten
tionist-countries?scid=30&did=140 [https://perma.cc/F7LD-MT67] [hereinafter Abolition-
ist and Retentionist Countries, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.]. In addition, the death penalty is
excluded from the punishments that the International Criminal Court may impose. (The
International Criminal Court was established by a treaty in 1998). See Nora V. Demleitner,
The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead?, 81 Or. L. Rev. 131,
143–144 (2002). Likewise, the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, established by the United Nations Security Council, also excluded the death
penalty. Id.
287. Kansas. v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 199 (2006). See also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (In discussing whether the Court should
intervene in the debate over same sex marriage, Chief Justice Roberts stated in language
that many would apply to a decision of the Court invalidating the death penalty “[i]t seizes
for itself a question the Constitution leaves to the people, at a time when the people are
engaged in a vibrant debate on that question.”).
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Justice Scalia’s argument is flawed in that it is difficult to imagine
any issue that needs to be regulated by the Supreme Court more than
the death penalty. First, there is the long history of racial discrimina-
tion in capital sentencing that continues to this day.288 Second, capital
cases are often extremely emotional and may motivate vengeance-
seeking behavior. It is often only the Court that is able to prevent mob
rule and ensure a fair process in these emotionally-charged and often
racially-tinged cases. Third, the defendants are an extremely unpopu-
lar minority who are not able to vindicate their rights through the
political process, as the November 2016 vote in California rejecting
abolition and supporting the “speeding up” of executions demon-
strates.289 Finally, according to Chief Justice Marshall, the Court has a
“virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise the jurisdiction bestowed
upon them by Congress and the Constitution.290 The Eighth Amend-
ment clearly mandates that the Court limit the types of punishment
that the state can inflict upon individuals.
The final objection to the Court striking down the death penalty
is to avoid a similar reaction when it found the death penalty as then
applied to be unconstitutional in Furman. The Furman decision—strik-
ing down the death penalty—generated an enormous public backlash
that unintentionally reinvigorated the death penalty, which had previ-
ously been on the decline.291 The decision mobilized the pro-death
penalty movement into a political force for the first time.292 Within a
few months of the decision, pro-death penalty activists campaigned in
every state for reinstatement of the death penalty and were joined by
police chiefs, state attorney generals, local district attorneys, and as-
sorted politicians.293 Within two years of the decision, thirty-five states
had enacted new capital statutes.294 The Supreme Court responded to
the backlash by reinstating the death penalty four years later.295
288. See generally Steiker & Steiker, supra note 27.
289. See Jazmine Ulloa & Julie Westfall, California voters approve an effort to speed up
the death penalty with Prop. 66, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/
politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-proposition-66-death-penalty-passes-
1479869920-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/FRY9-72S7].
290. Stephen I. Vladeck, Why an aggressive Supreme Court is good for the separation
of powers, WASH. TIMES (July 6, 2015) http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/
6/celebrate-liberty-month-why-an-aggressive-supreme-/?page=all [https://perma.cc/435M-
WMAP].
291. See David Garland, Peculiar Institution 230–34 (2010).
292. Id.
293. Id. at 232.
294. Id. at 233.
295. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
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Several factors suggest that the current Court would not face a
similar backlash should it find the death penalty unconstitutional.
First, prior to Furman, the Court had not issued any decisions regulat-
ing the death penalty. States had largely unfettered latitude in carry-
ing out the death penalty. Since 1976, the Court has placed important
limitations on capital punishment.296 Therefore, the doctrinal frame-
work is in place for the Court to strike down the death penalty. Fur-
thermore, several members of the Court, both past and present, have
been publicly critical of the death penalty297 and alerted the public to
the problems in the administration of the death penalty. Thus, a deci-
sion invalidating capital punishment would not be totally unexpected
as it had been when the Court issued its holding in Furman.
Second, the politics of the death penalty have substantially
changed. During the 1988 presidential campaign, Michael Dukakis’
opposition to the death penalty was a major campaign issue.298 By
2004, the politics of the issue had changed enough that the demo-
cratic nominee, John Kerry, was opposed to the death penalty, but his
opposition did not make the death penalty a major issue in that cam-
paign.299 A good example of the reaction the Court may anticipate if
it invalidated the death penalty occurred during the 2008 presidential
campaign. In the summer of 2008, during the heart of the presiden-
tial campaign, the Court issued its decision invalidating the death pen-
296. For instance, the Court has held that juveniles and the intellectually disabled can-
not be executed, see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 321 (2002); that the death penalty cannot be meted out for crimes do not involve
the taking of human life, see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) and Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008); that capital defendants have a right to be sentenced
by juries, see Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002); and that the defendant has wide
latitude in offering mitigating evidence to save his life, see Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274,
285 (2004).
297. See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 614–19 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing defects in
prevailing capital practice); Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 207–10 (2006) (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (arguing for a new capital jurisprudence in light of evidence of wrongful convic-
tions); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 71 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (questioning whether
death penalty serves any useful social purpose); Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (announcing that he would no longer vote to allow an
execution as a result of the Court’s failed attempts to rectify problems in the administra-
tion of the death penalty).
298. See Samuel R. Gross & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Second Thoughts: Americans’ Views
on the Death Penalty at the Turn of the Century, in Beyond Repair? America’s Death
Penalty 7, 42–43 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).
299. See Robert Moran, Kerry’s Death Penalty Dance, Nat’l Review (March 9, 2004),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/209815/kerry-s-death-penalty-dance-robert-moran
[https://perma.cc/7UXW-ZM4J].
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alty for rape of a child.300 Although both major presidential
candidates disagreed with the decision, neither candidate made the
decision an issue in the campaign.301 The reaction of opponents to
the decision was brief and the discussion quickly moved on to other
issues. In recent years, even candidates running for office in states that
have abolished the death penalty have not made capital punishment a
major campaign issue.
Third, the international community is significantly more inter-
connected than it was at the time of the Furman decision in 1972. The
international reaction to a Supreme Court decision striking down the
death penalty would likely be well received. Given the fact that most
countries in the world have outlawed the death penalty,302 this deci-
sion would enhance the United States’ international standing, and the
favorable international reaction would likely have a similar down-
stream effect on American public opinion. Therefore, there is consid-
erably less risk of public outcry today than there was in 1972 should
the death penalty be struck down on constitutional grounds.
Conclusion
In 1963, Justice Goldberg wrote a dissent urging the Court to
grant certiorari in order to decide whether the death penalty violated
the Eighth Amendment.303 He started a conversation which, nine
years later, led to the Court determining that it did in fact violate the
Constitution. Hopefully Justice Breyer’s dissent has similarly started
the much-needed conversation about whether the death penalty re-
mains a constitutional practice. As this article has discussed, many of
the problems that the Court believed would be eliminated—or at least
minimized—when it began to regulate the death penalty have re-
mained and, in some instances, been exacerbated: disparate racial ap-
plication, arbitrariness, the risk of executing innocent individuals, the
problem of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court should allow
these serious deficiencies to continue no longer. Almost every attempt
to reform the death penalty has failed. Rather than continue the
failed attempt to reform the death penalty, the Court needs to seri-
300. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 412–413.
301. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Bar Death Penalty for the Rape of a Child, N.Y.
TIMES (June 26, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/washington/26scotus
.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/L9MD-9HP5].
302. See Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra note 284.
303. See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
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ously consider abolition as the only logical alternative. This article
provides the doctrinal basis for doing so.
